Water System Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza by Van Atta, Phil
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
Master of Public Health Program Student 
Publications Master of Public Health Program 
2-1-2008 
Water System Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza 
Phil Van Atta 
Wright State University - Main Campus 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/mph 
 Part of the Community Health and Preventive Medicine Commons 
Repository Citation 
Van Atta, P. (2008). Water System Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza. Wright State University, Dayton, 
Ohio. 
This Master's Culminating Experience is brought to you for free and open access by the Master of Public Health 
Program at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Public Health Program Student 




Wright State University – Master in Public Health 
Culminating Experience  
Water System Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza  
February 1, 2008   
Phil Van Atta
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Table of Contents         i 
List of Tables          ii 
List of Figures         ii 
Appendices          iii 
Acknowledgements         iv 
Acronyms          v 
Abstract          1 
Introduction          2 
Purpose                   10  
Review of Literature                  11 
Methods                   16  
Results                   18  
Discussion                   23 
Conclusion                   39 











LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Summary of Ohio Water System Survey……………………….……………19 
Table 2: Vaccination Prioritization……………………………………………………27 
Table 3: Prioritization for Distribution of Antiviral Medications……………………. 28 
Table 4: Example of Criteria for Developing Water Utility COOP ……………..……34 






LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: World Health Organization - Global Map of H5N1, January 2008………… 3 
 
Figure 2: Example: Employee Absence and Potential Water System Disruptions……. 8 
Figure 3: Ohio Water Systems Currently Working On Pandemic Influenza Plan…..…20 
Figure 4: Ohio Water Systems With Pandemic Influenza Plan……………….………..20 
Figure 5: Ohio Water Systems Intending To Develop Pandemic Influenza Plan………21 
Figure 6: Ohio Water Systems: Pandemic Influenza Included In ERP…………..……..21 
Figure 7: Ohio Water Systems Pandemic Influenza Training Status…..……………….22 















Appendix A Wright State University Institutional Review Board documents….. A-1 
Appendix B Institutional Review Board submittals………………………………B-1 
Appendix C Public Health Competencies……………………………………….. C-1 
Appendix D Water System Pandemic Influenza COOP Plan…………………… D-1 
Appendix E Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist for Water Systems……….. E-1 
Appendix F Sources of Best Practices for Pandemic Influenza COOP………….. F-1 
















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS                                        
Dr. Sara Paton, Epidemiologist 
Center for Global Health Systems, Management, and Policy 
Wright State University 
 
Dr. Raymond Ten Eyck 
Associate Director of Public Health Practice 
Master of Public Health Program 
Center for Global Health Systems, Management, and Policy 
Wright State University 
 
Ms. Donna Winchester, Manager 
Division of Environmental Management 
City of Dayton Water Department 
 
Ms. Petra Weaver, Program Coordinator 
Master of Public Health Program 
Center for Global Health Systems, Management, and Policy 
Wright State University 
 
Mr. Carel Vandermeyden 
Senior Engineer 
Greater Cincinnati Water Works 
 
Mr. Glen Mudd 
Manager, Loss Control Service 




West Virginia Public Service Commission 
 
Patricia Lamb 




Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 
Public Health Dayton and Montgomery County 
 
Lorraine Cheek 
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 









AWWA  American Water Works Association 
 
CDC   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
CI/KR   Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources 
 
COOP   Continuity of Operations 
 
DHHS   U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
 
DHS   U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
 
EPA   Environmental Protection Agency 
 
FEMA   Federal Emergency Management Agency 
 
GISN   Global Information Surveillance Network 
 
IHR   International Health Regulations 
 
NICs   National Information Centers 
 
OEPA   Ohio Environmental Protection Agency 
 
PDD   Presidential Decision Directive 
   
WARN  Water Agency Response Network 
 
WHO   World Health Organization 
 
WHO CCs  World Health Organization Collaborating Centers 
 














      This project involved an investigation of water utility preparedness and best 
practices for pandemic influenza.  A pandemic could cause serious disruptions to the 
operations of critical infrastructure, including drinking water systems.  These disruptions 
could be caused by staffing shortages, power disruptions, and shortages of chemicals and 
other supplies.  Ensuring continuity of operations for drinking water systems is crucial to 
protect public health and safety, and to the economy of all communities.  Literature 
searches, interviews, and a survey of Ohio water systems indicated that water systems in 
Ohio and across the United States are preparing for pandemic influenza.  Pandemic 
influenza preparation and response plans for health departments, based on CDC 
guidelines, can be easily found online.   Business continuity plans and templates for the 
development of government agency pandemic influenza plans are also readily accessible.  
However, templates for developing pandemic influenza plans for water systems were not 
discovered during this investigation.  A template pandemic influenza plan for water 
systems was developed as a result of this project.   




      
Flu pandemics in the 20
th
 century occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968.  Public health 
and medical experts believe that another flu pandemic could occur at any time (CDC, 
2007; Fauci, 2006).  Pandemics occur when a virulent influenza virus undergoes genetic 
shift and human to human transmission occurs readily.  There is concern among public 
health officials that the avian influenza virus A (H5N1) could undergo genetic changes 
and cause a pandemic (Taubenberg, Morens, & Fauci, 2007 and CDC, 2007).  Avian and 
human influenza viruses could recombine in intermediate hosts, such as has happened in 
pigs, to form new viral strains that are lethal to humans (Greene, 2006). 
Avian influenza viruses can spread between wild birds and domestic birds.  
Migratory waterfowl can infect other birds directly or through fecal contamination of 
water used by domestic birds.  Currently, human avian influenza H5N1 cases are 
associated with close contact with contaminated chickens and other poultry (WHO, 
2008).  There is some statistical and laboratory evidence indicating that limited, non-
sustained human-human transmission of H5N1 may have occurred (WHO, 2008; Yang et 
al., 2007; Uyeke & Bresee, 2007).  If H5N1 undergoes genetic shift and becomes easily 
transmissible between humans, pandemic influenza could spread rapidly.  Because of 
increased global commerce and international travel, diseases can now spread rapidly 
throughout the world which would likely make a pandemic in the 21 century much more 
deadly than in the past. 
A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study of disease rates for a 
new pandemic estimated that in the United States, 40 – 100 million people could be 
sickened.  The CDC study provided a “most likely estimate” death toll of 89,000 – 
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300,000, with “best case” to “worst case” death toll range of 75,000 – 422,000 (CDC, 
2007).   The World Health Organization uses a “conservative estimate” of 2 – 7.4 million 
worldwide deaths for a mild pandemic as in 1957.  The number of deaths could be much 
higher if a new pandemic had death rates similar to the 1918 pandemic (WHO, 2007). 
Avian Influenza virus H5N1 has a high mortality rate.  As of January 21, 2008 
there were 352 reported human cases of H5N1 influenza world wide with a death rate of 
62 %.   These cases were mostly confined to Asia with other cases in the Middle East and 
Africa.  Most of the cases were related to handling or close contact with poultry with the 
possibility of some human-human transmission (WHO, 2008). 
 





Response to a modern pandemic would be greatly improved compared to the three 
influenza pandemics of the last 100 years.  Scientists have a better understanding of 
influenza viruses, including H5N1, and host species.  It is known that eliminating sick 
birds reduces the possibility of transmission of influenza.  Anti-viral drugs are available 
and there is better knowledge of how to improve vaccines.  Antibiotics are available for 
secondary infections related to influenza (Greene, 2006). 
Since 2005 a great deal of pandemic influenza preparation has been undertaken or 
planned by public health agencies, governments, private industries, and public utilities in 
the United States.  All states were required to develop pandemic influenza plans (U.S. 
DHHS, 2006).  Vaccine and anti-viral production and research have been accelerated to 
meet expected demands. 
Recent scientific advances and increased vaccine manufacturing capacity have 
prompted experts to increase their projections of how many pandemic influenza vaccine 
courses can be made available in the coming years.  Last spring, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and vaccine manufacturers reported that about 100 million courses 
of pandemic influenza vaccine based on the H5N1 avian influenza strain could be 
produced immediately with standard technology. Experts now anticipate that global 
production capacity will rise to 4.5 billion pandemic immunization courses per year in 
2010.  It would take 6.7 billion immunization courses to protect the whole world.  In 
2007, manufacturers increased production capacity of trivalent (three viral strains) 
seasonal influenza vaccines to an estimated 565 million doses, from 350 million doses 
produced in 2006 (WHO, 2007). 
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Influenza vaccine production is based on monitoring of seasonal and potentially 
pandemic influenza viruses.  The Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) gathers 
influenza virus information from National Influenza Centers (NICs) and WHO 
Collaborating Centers.  International Health Regulations (IHR) requires member states to 
report cases of human influenza that are caused by novel viruses, such as H5N1.  In 2004, 
the GISN started gathering H5N1 virus information so that the WHO could develop and 
provide H5N1 candidate vaccine viruses to vaccine producers.  Manufacturers have used 
these candidate viruses to produce and test H5N1 vaccines.  Production and widespread 
distribution of vaccines is critical for the control of influenza.  Because of it’s 
pathogenicity to eggs and poultry, the development of H5N1 vaccine is more complicated 
than the production of seasonal vaccines. Reverse genetics is used to make the virus less 
pathogenic so that it can be grown in eggs and produced safely (WHO, 2007). 
In April 2007, the United States government approved a pre-pandemic vaccine for 
H5N1.  According to the national Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan 
One Year Summary issued in July 2007, enough pre-pandemic vaccine is available to 
treat 6 million people, with plans to stockpile enough pre-pandemic vaccine for 20 
million people.  Federal and state stockpiles contain enough antiviral medications for 50 
million people (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2007).   
In addition to widespread illness and fatalities, a pandemic flu epidemic could 
create major disruptions to the global economy.  A pandemic could cause up to $800 
billion dollars in economic loses world wide (World Bank, 2007).  The U.S. 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that a modern pandemic with an effect similar to 
1918’s pandemic could cause a loss of national income of approximately $600 billion in 
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the United States (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006).  Operations of critical 
infrastructure, including drinking water systems, would be greatly affected by staffing 
shortages, power disruptions, and shortages of chemicals and other supplies. 
There are approximately 160,000 public water systems in the United States, 
serving 84% of the nation through the provision of water for domestic, industrial, and 
commercial use (U.S. DHS, 2007).  Ensuring continuity of operations for drinking water 
systems is crucial to maintaining the health and economy of all communities.  Water is 
necessary for drinking, cooking, fire protection, and basic hygiene.  Businesses, factories, 
hospitals, clinics and other public health infrastructure need water to maintain operations.  
Homes, businesses, and communities are dependent on a continuous supply of water from 
public water systems to enable the conveyance and treatment of sewage.    
The public health implications are enormous if water suppliers cannot maintain 
essential operations.  Inadequately treated water could lead to waterborne disease 
outbreaks.  The largest waterborne disease outbreak in the United States was caused 
when heavy spring rains and runoff from animal feedlots combined with treatment plant 
changes to cause an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in Milwaukee in 1993.  This outbreak 
caused over 400,000 illnesses and at least 40 deaths (Craun & Calderon, 2001).  
Sufficient quantities of water at adequate pressure are also needed to fight fires and 
prevent backflow contamination of water mains. 
In the event of a pandemic flu, community water systems could face critical 
shortages of personnel to maintain and operate well fields, intake structures, treatment 
plants, pumping stations, and distribution systems.  Labor shortages could also affect 
water quality testing, vehicle repair, administration, and payroll systems.  Influenza 
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caused labor shortages in transportation, energy, and other sectors could lead to 
insufficient power, parts, general supplies, and water treatment chemicals (Figure 2).   
To prepare for labor shortages water utilities need to plan to use “skeleton” teams that 
have diverse skills for operations, maintenance and repair.  Essential personnel will need 
to be identified in advance and protected from illness during pandemics.  Operations of 
water systems could be disrupted by shortages of essential personnel in many areas 
including source conveyance, treatment, distribution, engineering, maintenance, water 
quality monitoring and finance/payroll.  Contingency plans or systems need to be 
developed for alternate sources of chemicals and other supplies, and emergency power.  
Water systems need to identify essential functions and critical resources to prepare for 
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disruptions prevent deliveries of disinfection chemicals.  Water systems will need to 
establish or reinforce procurement systems that enable cash payments for necessary 
supplies.  Emergencies supplies that are cached at strategic location could become vital 
for supporting personnel during the weeks or months of a pandemic.  In addition, a 
“wellness system” will be necessary for screening employees for illness and isolating 
healthy employees.  In 2004, eight major water and wastewater organizations formed the 
Water Sector Coordinating Council (WSCC) to reduce water sector vulnerabilities.  One 
of the 14 focus issues for the WSCC is pandemic influenza (American Water Works 
Association, 2007). 
Business continuity planning (BCP) is a comprehensive, proactive planning 
process that ensures that an entity remains functioning during and following emergencies 
(ASIS, 2005; Security and Prosperity Partnership, 2007).  BCP includes strategies, 
procedures, and resources used by an organization to respond, recover and resume 
operations in the event of substantial disruptive incidents (Moore, 2000).  Continuity of 
operations (COOP) planning specifically describes preparation, response and recovery 
actions that are necessary to ensure that critical services or products are produced and 
delivered during and following specified emergencies (FEMA, 2007).  American Water 
Works Association Research Project 2929 defined business continuity for water systems 
as, “activities that ensure that the water utility is able to continue its business of providing 
water services to its customers until normal business functions assume a state of 
normalcy” (AWWARF, 2006).      




This project involved an investigation of water utility preparations for pandemic 
influenza in the United States.  Another objective of the project was determining “best 
practices” for water utility continuity of operations during pandemics.  The final project 
objective was to develop a template plan for water utility pandemic influenza continuity 
of operations planning.  The main focus of this plan is maintaining operations and 
protecting employees.   
This culminating experience project also resulted in the development of a draft 
pandemic continuity of operations plan for the City of Dayton’s Division of Water 
Supply and Treatment.  A separate general template plan will be developed for other 
divisions within the City of Dayton Water Department.  For security reasons, these two 
plans were not attached to the culminating experience manuscript.   
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The World Health Organization, the United States government and health 
departments across the United States have developed Pandemic Flu response plans or 
protocols.  In 1999 the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) tasked states to 
prepare plans for pandemic influenza and provided guidelines (USDHHS, 2007).  In 
May, 2006 the United States Government’s Homeland Security Council released the 
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan.  In April, 2007 the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released “Pandemic Influenza Best Practices 
and Model Protocols” for use by state, local, tribal and territorial personnel when 
developing best practices for pandemic plans or training programs (US DHS, 2007).  In 
July, 2007 the Department of Health and Human Services issued the “One Year 
Summary of National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (USDHHS, 
2007). 
The main goals of the U.S. government’s response plan for pandemic influenza 
are to limit the spread of a pandemic; mitigate disease, suffering, and death; sustain 
infrastructure, and lessen the impact on the economy and society (CDC, 2007).  An effort 
is being made to produce enough vaccine within six months of a pandemic to inoculate 
the entire U.S. population.  The U.S. government has contracted with six manufacturers 
to achieve this goal by 2011 and to stockpile pandemic vaccine doses ahead of time for 
20 million people (USDHHS, 2007).      
In 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Directive 63 that identified water as 
one of the nation’s critical infrastructure sectors (USDHS memo, 2006).  In September, 
2006 the U.S. DHS released the “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and 
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Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources”.  This guide listed water 
as one of seventeen Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources sectors.  Each sector 
collaborates with the Department of Homeland Security and sector-specific government 
agencies (US DHS, 2006).   
In May 2007, the U.S. DHS released “Water - Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan” 
(USDHS, 2007).  U.S. government plans emphasize the need for critical infrastructure 
sectors, including water, to prepare continuity of operations plans for pandemic influenza 
and other hazards.  Continuity of operations (COOP) planning or plans have written 
procedures that systems or business can use to plan or respond to emergencies that 
threaten continuation of essential operations.  These plans identify critical components 
for continuity of operations; identifying and protecting essential personnel, cross training 
of employees, securing alternate supplies, ensuring emergency power sources, and 
maintaining critical functions.  
The July, 2007 federal government summary of the national pandemic influenza 
plan stated that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) is responsible for 
preparing the water sector for pandemic influenza  by, “engaging federal, state, and local 
partners in order to develop and promote the establishment of mutual aid and assistance 
agreements…”(USDHHS, 2007).  In addition, President Bush has tasked USEPA to 
assist the nation’s critical drinking water and wastewater infrastructure, collectively 
known as the water sector, to maintain operations in the event of an influenza pandemic 
(U.S. DHS, 2007).  The USEPA, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA), 
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the CDC, and various other agencies have issued fact sheets about Pandemic Influenza 
and preparedness sheets that discuss business continuity.   
 
Public Health Agency Planning For Pandemic Influenza 
State and local health department pandemic influenza plans were also reviewed 
for this project.  Occasionally these plans made passing references to critical 
infrastructure or public water supply.  Usually, the only reference to drinking water was a 
mention for a need to stockpile bottled water for staff.  One plan stated, “work with 
public water system, local public health, (et al.) to assure safety of water supply” 
(Minnesota Department of Public Health, 2006).   The South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control web site had a brief reference to potential labor 
shortages, “Absenteeism may affect critical supplies such as water and electric…” (South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, 2007).    
Pandemic influenza preparation is a relatively new area of emergency preparation 
for water systems.  Pandemic influenza preparation is not specifically covered in 
American Water Works Association (AWWA) or AWWW Research Foundation 
(AWWARF) books and manuals released as of October 2007.  The OEPA released its 
first public document for water system pandemic influenza preparation in late 2006.  This 
document is a two page questionnaire for water and wastewater plant owners and 
operators.  The OEPA does not include pandemic influenza in the template plan for 
Drinking Water Supply Emergency Plan that was developed for public water systems 
(OEPA web page, 2007).                     
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It is considered unlikely that properly treated drinking water can serve as a mode 
of transmission for the H5N1 virus.  However, very little literature exists for this subject.  
Literature that discusses drinking water treatment and other viruses, such as Norwalk-like 
and Hepatitis A, is readily available (Chalapati et al., 1988; Salvato, 2003; American 
Water Works Association, 1999). 
Some bodies of water could be contaminated by dead birds or the feces of 
infected birds. Chicken feces are sometimes used as a cheap protein source for fish farms 
in Asia.   Conventionally treated water should not pose a health risk even if the water 
source is an open reservoir that is accessed by infected water birds (Cooperative Research 
Centre, 2007).  A Netherlands study of Avian Influenza Virus infection via water also 
concluded that the risk of drinking water transmission is negligible (Achijven et al., 
2005).      
According to a review of evidence by the World Health Organization it appears to 
be unlikely that H5N1 can be transmitted through effectively treated drinking water or 
sewage (WHO, 2006).  It is believed that traditional methods of water treatment, 
coagulation and filtration followed by disinfection, will reduce any avian influenza virus 
present in the water to insignificant numbers.  The avian influenza virus has an outer 
protein envelope that is susceptible to damage by oxidants such as chlorine. This would 
destroy the infectivity of the virus (WHO, 2006).  The United States Department of 
Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency conducted research which 
indicated that typical chlorine levels used by public water systems are adequate to 
inactivate H5N1 virus.  Filtration is also effective for removing the virus (USEPA, 2007). 
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Continuity of Operations Planning by Water Systems 
Government agencies emphasize the need for critical infrastructure sectors such 
as water to prepare plans for continuity of operations.  However, few water utilities 
address continuity of operations in their emergency response plans (American Water 
Works Association, 2006).  The USEPA and the OEPA encourage water utilities to 
prepare for supply disruptions and employee shortages in the event of pandemic influenza 
(OEPA, 2007).  The USEPA is working with the Departments of Homeland Security and 
Health and Human Services to give water system workers priority access to vaccines and 
antiviral drugs.  In the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak, water and sewer systems 
would experience decreased staffing levels because of illness.  Ensuring that enough 
employees are available to perform essential services is seen as the most significant 
factor for maintaining continuity of operations (American Water Works Association, 
2006). 
Existing software products could be used by water utilities to develop continuity 
of operations plans.   These products include RAMSAFE, Phoenix, and Disaster 
Recovery Systems (Westby & Saldanha, 2004).  One of the objectives of the American 
Water Works Association Research Foundation Project 2929 was to identify best 
practices for water utility emergency plans and planning programs (AWWARF, 2006).  
The project investigated business continuity planning in the water sector but did not 
investigate pandemic influenza preparedness. 
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IV. METHODS 
This project included a survey of medium and large water systems in Ohio to 
determine the extent of preparations for pandemic flu.  It was decided to only survey 
medium and large water systems due to considerations of data manageability and the 
belief that small systems were not likely to have pandemic influenza plans.  Water system 
size was determined from Ohio Environmental Protection Agency records for the number 
of people supplied with water (Ohio EPA, 2007).  The survey was approved for exempt 
status by the Wright State University Institutional Review Board.  Data from the survey 
was accumulated for descriptive statistical analysis of the current state of preparedness of 
water systems in Ohio.   
Surveys were delivered by mail and/or email to a total of 86 medium and large 
water systems.  For purposes of this study, water systems that served a population in the 
range of 20,000 to 99,999 were designated as medium size.  Water systems that served a 
population of at least 100,000 were characterized as large systems.  Survey results were 
grouped by these system size ranges; 20,000 – 49,999, 50,000 - 99,999, 100,000-199,999, 
and greater than 199,000.  
Most of the surveys were sent via mail.  Some surveys were emailed to contacts at 
larger water systems if an email recipient was identified as likely to respond to the 
survey.  Surveys were delivered by mail or email to a total of 86 medium and large water 
systems.  A copy of the survey is attached in Appendix B. 
An effort was made to collect pandemic continuity of operation plans along with 
returned surveys, through requests to water utilities, and through internet searches.  These 
plans were to be collected for comparison with utility industry and federal government 
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standards for continuity of operations to determine best practices for water utility 
continuity of operations during pandemics.  Benchmarks for water system continuity of 
operations and public health preparedness were established from critical areas identified 
by the USEPA and the American Water Works Association.   
Information for this project was also gathered from presentations delivered at 
water industry conferences and seminars.  Phone conversations were held with key 
personnel in water systems that have written pandemic influenza continuity of operations 
plans or were currently working on a plan.  Other discussions were held with public 
health officials and emergency preparedness experts to verify critical areas for pandemic 
influenza preparedness.  The relationship between public health preparedness and critical 
infrastructure, especially drinking water, was one of the areas examined.    
Existing pandemic flu plans were reviewed to determine applicability and 
adaptability for inclusion in a template plan for water utility pandemic continuity of 
operations.  Some of the essential components for this template were also determined 
from USEPA and Department of Homeland Security documents.  Critical infrastructure 
continuity of operations check lists in business continuity documents were used to verify 
that the template included necessary elements. 





Ohio Water System Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
A total of 50 (58%) completed pandemic influenza preparedness surveys were 
returned in September and October, 2007 from medium and large Ohio water systems.  
Forty-six publicly owned water systems and four privately owned systems returned 
surveys.  One completed survey indicated that it served a population (9500) less than the 
target size of at least 20,000.  This survey was not included in data summaries.  Although 
public records indicated that five systems were in the two largest system categories, 
surveys were received from six systems for each of these categories.  It is possible that 
the number of surveys received was greater than the number of pre-identified systems, 
five for each category, because these systems actually serve more customers than are 
indicated in Ohio EPA online records.     
One surveyed utility indicated that the local health department “would handle” 
their pandemic influenza planning. Eighty-eight percent of the targeted systems returning 
surveys indicated that they either have a plan, in some cases incorporated into their main 
emergency response plan (ERP), or they intend to develop a plan.  Twelve percent of the 
systems indicated that they did not have a plan or an intention to develop a plan.  Two 
systems reported that they address one potential impact of pandemic influenza, staffing 
reductions in their existing emergency response plans, but did not indicate having a plan 
that addressed other areas of pandemic influenza planning, e.g. social distancing. 
Only eight percent of surveyed water systems had participated in training related 
to pandemic influenza planning and response.  A majority of systems, 86 percent, 
indicated an interest in pandemic influenza preparedness training.   Interest in training 
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ranged from 67 percent for the 100,000 – 199,000 system category to 100 percent for the 
50,000 – 99,999 system category. 
 















Have a plan. 4 5 1 3 13 
Working on a 
plan. 
1 0 1 1 3 
Intend to develop 
a plan. 
10 3 2 1 16 
Pan Flu included 
in ERP 












60 16 5* 5* 86 
Public systems 
returning surveys 
25 10 6 5 46 
Private systems 
returning surveys 
2 1 0 1 4 
Total surveys 
returned 
27 11 6 6 50 
Surveys returned 
% 
45% 69% 100%* 100%* 58% 
* The number of surveys returned was greater than the number of systems in these 















































































Existing Pandemic Influenza Plans 
Thirteen of the fifty Ohio water systems returning surveys indicated that they had 
existing pandemic influenza plans.  Three of the four privately owned and operated water 
systems indicated that they have existing pandemic influenza plans.  One Ohio water 
system provided a pandemic influenza plan for this project.  Two systems from outside 
Ohio allowed viewing of their pandemic influenza plans.  Security concerns were voiced 
by other water systems when requests to view their pandemic influenza plans were 
denied.    
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VI. DISCUSSION 
United States Critical Infrastructure - Pandemic Influenza Preparedness  
Federal and private Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) sectors are 
preparing for pandemic flu through sector specific councils.  Water is one of the 17 
identified sectors in the U.S. Homeland Security document Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources.  There is a strong interdependence between water and other critical sectors.  
Water is indispensable to other sectors but dependent on energy, transportation, and 
chemical sectors to maintain operations.  Although officially designed for the private 
sector, which encompasses eighty-five percent of critical infrastructure resources, this 
Guide provides pandemic planning and background materials that can be used by both 
public and private critical infrastructure.   
The main objective of the Guide is to stimulate CI/KR owner-operators to 
“develop and integrate effective continuity of operations plans that ensure essential 
services remain functional and essential goods remain available in the event of a 
pandemic” (USDHS, 2006).  Continuity of operations would be challenged by the 
reduction in available workers due to illness, and disruption in the movement of people 
and goods.  The Guide categorizes pandemic influenza as an extreme challenge to 
continuity of operations and promotes development of a Continuity of Operations Plan – 
Essential (COP-E) as an extension of a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) that 
address emergencies like hurricanes or earthquakes.  Basic Contingency Plans are 
designed for routine challenges like power outages (see Figure 8). 
 24 





 Adapted from Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006). 
 
       
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for coordinating 
pandemic influenza preparedness for the drinking water sector in the United States.  





















of the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources.  This information will identify specific measures that 
water systems can undertake to maintain continuity of operations in the event of 
pandemic influenza (USDHS, 2006). 
Existing pandemic influenza template plans for water systems were not located in 
the literature or through an online search of government documents.   The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) website has downloadable template 
documents for continuity of operations plans with a separate pandemic influenza 
appendix.  These documents are designed for government agencies (USDHS, 2007).  The 
official government pandemic influenza preparedness website provides downloadable 
planning documents and checklists for businesses.   
The U.S. EPA and Ohio EPA have regulatory responsibility for drinking water 
systems.  As of February 1, 2008, neither agency provided pandemic influenza template 
plans for water systems.  The Ohio EPA has a Drinking Water Supply Emergency Plan 
guidance document and template that water systems can use for development of system 
specific emergency plans.  The guidance document has a list of man-made or natural 
disasters that water systems should prepare for but does not include pandemic influenza 
or continuity of operations (OEPA, 2007).  
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Ohio Emergency 
Management Agency stress the need for individuals and families to prepare and store 
emergency kits that contain food, water, and emergency supplies (USDHS, 2008 and 
OEMA, 2008).   The American Red Cross provides check lists and emergency kits that 
households can use for emergency planning and preparation (American Red Cross, 
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2008).  Water systems should inform their customers of the importance of emergency kits 
and encourage customers to store a three day supply of water to prepare for potential 
supply disruptions.  This information could be provided at water utility web sites or 
disseminated through annual reports, water bills, or the USEPA required, Consumer 
Confidence Report. 
  
Public Health Agency Coordination with Critical Infrastructure 
In the United States, state health departments have primacy for public health 
programs.  States delegate control of health programs to local health departments, 
including pandemic influenza preparedness.  State and local health departments have 
developed pandemic influenza plans in all 50 states.    
A search of public health department pandemic influenza plans revealed that the 
only reference to public water supplies was usually in the section that listed prioritization 
for vaccination and distribution of antiviral medications.  Prioritization of vaccination and 
distribution of antivirals follows guidance from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan.  Public utility personnel are in Tier 2, subtier 









Table 2 – Vaccination Prioritization    
Priority Groups for Vaccination 





















Tier 2 Subtier A Subtier B 
-Infants and elderly 
-Persons 6 months to 64 years with 
one high-risk condition 
 
-Remainder of public health 
workforce 
-Public safety personnel (fire, police) 
-Transportation personnel 
-Telecommunications personnel 
-Public utility personnel 
 
Tier 3 -Key government health decision makers 
-Funeral directors/embalmers 








Table 3 – Prioritization for Distribution of Antiviral Medications 
Priority Groups for Antiviral Medications 
Tier Group 
1 Patients admitted to hospital with influenza 
2 Health care workers with direct patient contact, and Emergency Medical 
Services personnel directly involved with patient transport 
3 Highest risk outpatients with influenza: immunocompromised persons and 
pregnant women 
4 Public health personnel critical to pandemic response, vaccinators, public 
safety, and key government officials 
5 Increased risk outpatients with influenza: children 12 to 23 months, persons 
>65 years, persons with underlying medical conditions 
6 Outbreak response in nursing homes and other residential settings 
7 Health care workers in Emergency Department, Intensive Care Unit, dialysis, 
and Emergency Medical Services settings 
8 Critical infrastructure personnel in vaccination priority group Tier 2, 
Subtier B, and health care workers without direct patient contact 
9 Other outpatients with influenza not included in Tiers 1-8 
10 Highest risk outpatients 
11 Other health care workers with direct patient contact 
      
Any other references to public water supplies or other critical infrastructure in 
public health pandemic plans were usually quite brief.  One plan stated, “Work with 
public water supply, local public health, etc. to assure safety of water supply” (Minnesota 
Dept. of Health, 2006).  A September 2007 report by the Congressional Research Service 
provided an analysis of state pandemic influenza preparedness plans authored by public 
health officials.   The report stated that only 11 of the state plans mentioned essential 
services other than public health and healthcare services.  Only seven of the plans 
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mentioned continuity of essential services, including public utilities (Congressional 
Research Service, 2007).    
Public health agencies have continuity of operations plans to ensure that they will 
be able to provide vaccinations, disease control, and other essential public health services 
in the event of a pandemic.  However, these essential services would be greatly impacted 
if water or other utilities were disrupted.  Major disruptions of water systems caused by 
pandemics could potentially cause waterborne disease outbreaks that overwhelm health 
care systems and public health services.  Also, reductions in water system staffing caused 
by pandemics could impact the repair of pumps or broken water pipelines.  This could 
cause loss of water service for public health facilities and impact the delivery of public 
health services. 
 
Water System Preparation for Pandemic Influenza in the United States 
Water systems across the United States have developed plans or have started 
preparing for pandemic influenza.  The City of Denver water utility, which serves 1.2 
million customers, started upgrading its emergency plan to include pandemic influenza in 
2006.    Denver’s preparations included creating 37 emergency kits to be stored at water 
treatment plants and key pumping stations. The kits contain enough food to feed one or 
two people for three days, a sleeping bag, portable stove, cook kit, toilet paper, flashlights 
and batteries, duct tape, rope, first-aid supplies, masks, gloves, and hand sanitizer.  If the 
utility is alerted of early stages of pandemic influenza, Denver’s plan includes cross-
training for key positions and a gradual shut-down of non-essential operations.    
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The City of Tacoma, Washington held a pandemic influenza training exercise in 
December 2006.  This exercise tested the utility’s response to a pandemic that reduced 
staffing by 40 percent.  After an evaluation of the exercise the City of Tacoma began a 
cross training program for water utility employees.  This program allows people in 
different positions to fill in as water plant operators or other positions in an emergency 
(AWWA, 2007). 
The American Water Works Association (AWWA) convened a panel of 
regulatory, water system and public health experts in early May 2006 to address water 
utility preparedness for a flu pandemic.  The panel’s discussions, reported in the June 
2006 Journal of the AWWA, emphasized the importance of water utility preparations for 
pandemic influenza and the need to partner with public health officials (AWWA, 2006).  
Topics discussed included employees returning to work after recovering from influenza.  
These employees will be vital for maintaining operations because of their acquired 
immunity.  
The USEPA and the Department of Homeland Security are jointly developing a 
bird flu preparedness guide for water and wastewater systems.  The Association of 
Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA) developed a pandemic influenza reference guide 
and checklist for water utilities.  This document was released to AMWA members or 
subscribers to the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (AMWA, 2007).  The 
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority and the South Florida Water Management 
District have developed continuity of operations plans for pandemic influenza (Brown & 
Caldwell, 2006). 
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Water utilities should establish partnerships with public health agencies and 
emergency officials to provide early warning of pandemic influenza and to enhance 
preparation for pandemic influenza.  Joint training exercises would benefit both water 
systems and public health agencies.  Water systems could benefit by obtaining 
information from public health agencies about influenza protection measures and advance 
knowledge of pandemic influenza outbreaks.  Regular communications from public 
health agencies about influenza-type illnesses could provide early notice of pandemic 
influenza or potential bio-terrorism.  Influenza-type illnesses can be a symptom of a 
bioterrorism agent such as anthrax (Gensheimer et al., 2003).   
Public health agencies could improve sections of their pandemic plans to enhance 
support for water systems that provide drinking water and sanitation for the community.  
This support could include advance planning of vaccinations for water system personnel.  
These efforts by water systems and public health could improve the public health and 
critical infrastructure components of pandemic influenza plans for both sectors. 
To ensure effectiveness, pandemic influenza continuity of operations plans should 
be flexible, easy to read, and capable of quick implementation.  One half of utilities 
surveyed in a 2006 American Water Works Association Research Foundation study said 
their (all hazards) emergency plans were cumbersome.  The time sensitive nature of 
emergencies makes ease of use very important. 
To prepare for pandemics or other emergencies water utilities should stockpile 
emergency supplies, develop alternate sources or systems for power and treatment 
chemicals; and acquire backup communication systems that could include radios with 
multiple channels, all-in-one wireless communication devices, ham radios, and satellite 
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internet service.  To support telecommuting, water systems could buildup information 
technology systems by increasing bandwidth, adding redundant servers, etc.  Preparation 
for pandemic influenza and establishing mutual aid agreements can prepare a water utility 
for natural disasters or other emergencies that affect continuity of operations, including 
terrorism. 
Ensuring that enough employees are available to perform essential services is 
seen as the most significant factor for maintaining continuity of operations.  Cross 
training of employees can provide a line of succession for management positions and 
backup employees for operational positions.  Encouraging seasonal influenza vaccination 
is one measure that water systems can take to protect the health of their work force before 
a pandemic.  During pandemics social distancing, hygiene measures, and access to anti-
virals and virus specific vaccination will be crucial.  Establishing a relationship in 
advance with local public health officials could facilitate the distribution of anti-virals 
and vaccines to water system personnel.  Treatment of employees with influenza will be 
problematic because the health care system will be overwhelmed by a pandemic.   
 
Water System Preparation for Pandemic Influenza in Ohio 
 
The Ohio EPA participated with public health and other agencies in a Pandemic 
Influenza “functional” exercise conducted from January 24 – February 6, 2007.  Six 
pandemic influenza target areas were tested during the exercise; planning, 
communications, isolation, incident management, medical surge, and public health 
epidemiology and laboratory testing.  During the exercise, Ohio EPA activated its 
pandemic influenza plan and called several water systems to determine how those 
systems would respond to various scenarios.  At least one utility was contacted to 
 33 
determine how it would respond to a supply disruption for disinfection chemicals.  The 
Ohio EPA objective for this exercise was to maintain “safe” water supplies by 
performing the agency’s essential functions, regulatory, outreach/assistance, and 
administration (OEPA, 2007).  This exercise is scheduled to be conducted again in 
February 2008. 
In 2007 utilities and agencies in Ohio began developing an Ohio Water Assistance 
and Response Network (WARN) system.  Utilities that register with Ohio WARN would 
be prepared to assist or receive assistance from other utilities in the event of emergencies, 
including pandemic influenza.  This assistance could come in the form of providing 
operators, equipment or supplies (Ohio Section AWWA, 2007).   However, mutual aid 
would be hindered or prevented if pandemic influenza reduced the staff or supplies of 
water utilities throughout Ohio.  
 
Continuity of Operations Planning - Best Practices 
 
The most critical issue for water utilities in the event of pandemic influenza is 
maintaining continuity of operations.  A reduced work force, and potential disruption of 
supplies, chemicals, and energy would create major challenges to continuity of 
operations.  Other challenges could include inadequate bandwidth for telecommuting, 
inadequate funding, and lack of preparation.   
A review of literature, including water industry publications, indicated that few 
water utilities address continuity of operations in their emergency response plans.   
Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) can be developed for different emergency 
planning scenarios, including pandemic influenza.   Essential elements of a COOP 
include identification of essential functions, critical services, essential staff positions, and 
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critical resources.  Essential functions for water systems include disinfection, filtration, 
maintenance, repairs, and pumping.  An example of criteria used to determine critical 





Table 4 – Example of Criteria for Developing Water Utility COOP 
 
Components for Development of Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP)  
Category Examples 
1. Identify Essential Functions Provide potable water. 
  
2. Identify Critical Services Pump water 
Disinfect water 
  
3. Identify Critical Resources Electricity for pumping 
Chlorine for Disinfection 
  
4. Identify Essential Personnel Operators for treatment plant 
 Mechanics for repair of pumps 
  
5. COOP Component Emergency Generator Plan 
 Alternate Disinfectant Plan 
 Pandemic Influenza Plan 
 




Best practices for water system continuity of operations planning for pandemic 
influenza were established through a review of literature and from critical areas identified 
by the USEPA and the American Water Works Association.  A summary of planning, 
description, and action elements that incorporate best practices is listed in Table 5.  





Table 5 – Best Practices For Pandemic Influenza COOP For Water Systems 
 
Essential Elements of Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans for Water Systems 
Planning Description Action 
Identify pandemic 
coordinator and team 
Identify all planning 




Assign members to team. 
Define essential services 
and products. 
 List essential services. 
 
 
Identify essential resources Energy, chemicals, supplies. Develop alternate energy, 
supplier and disinfection 
plans.  
Identify and prioritize 
essential services, products 
and personnel. 
Conduct thorough review of 
all processes. 
List primary, secondary and 
non-essential functions and 
services in plan. 
Delegate authorities and 
lines of succession. 
Use existing succession 
plans or develop succession 
plans and lines of 
succession. 
Identify authorities and 
lines of succession in plan. 
Determine essential 
positions for maintaining 
essential services. 
Conduct review of all 
positions. 
Identify essential employees 
and backups. 
Determine current status of 
pandemic influenza in 
region on daily basis. 
Forecast worker absences. 
Track employees who have 
influenza and employees 
that have recovered. 
Monitor public health 
information or establish 
public health contact. 
Monitor absences during 
pandemic.  
Keep records that track 
employees that have 
recovered from influenza. 
Meet with public health 
officials. 
Monitor federal, state, and 
local pandemic information 
sites. 
Develop forms for tracking 
employees that have 
recovered from influenza. 
Plan for sustaining essential 
functions, supplies, 
material, and equipment. 
Identify and propose actions 
to protect and sustain 
essential functions, supplies, 
materials, equipment, and 
systems support. 
Cross train employees. 
Retrain recently retired 
employees.  
Establish mutual aid 
agreements.   
Establish contracts for 
temporary workers. 
Determine trigger points for 






Propose cost effective and  
efficient preparedness 
actions to stockpile essential 
supplies, material, and 
equipment. 
Propose cost effective and 




 Establish or update 
emergency communication 
procedures and maintain 
equipment.  
Sustain essential workers. Assess needs and 
requirements to protect and 
sustain all employees. 
Ensure medical resources 
for employees. 
Encourage annual influenza 
vaccinations for employees. 
Establish telecommuting 
and flexible work hour 
policies. 
Ensure IT is adequate for 
telecommuting. 
Establish hygiene control 
procedures and train 
employees. 
Screen employee health. 
Establish travel restriction 
and teleconferencing 
policies. 
Establish policies for 
sequestering critical staff. 
Store emergency kits at key 
locations. 
Practice social distancing 
(limit contacts with the 
public by ending tours, 
delay meter reading, etc.) 
Identify and assess 
worker’s family care 
requirements. 
While respecting privacy 
protections, identify and 
assess issues for supporting 
worker family care. 
Develop pandemic 
education information for 
worker families and 
disseminate. 
Assess the number of 
workers with school-age 
children or other dependents 
at home. 
Identify other special needs 
for family support. 
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Identify sick leave and pay 
issues. 
 
Employees may violate sick 
leave policy caring for 
family members, etc. 
Paychecks may be delayed. 
Shifts worked may exceed 
union or employer rules. 
 
Develop human resource 
policies to address 
pandemic influenza issues: 
excessive sick leave, 
overtime, work rules, etc. 
 
Identify, document, 
coordinate, and test “trigger 
points” and actions. 
 
Assess and identify 
“triggering events” for each 
action, such as changes in 
WHO or U.S. government 
alert matrix. 
Assess what triggers a 
change in the Federal, State, 
and local pandemic alert 
status. 
Establish authorities, 
triggers, and procedures for 
activating and terminating 
response and recovery 
plans.  
Keep records of actions & 
expenditures. 
Assess and develop 
exercise and training 
programs. 
Involve internal and 
external partners in training. 
Conduct training at least 
annually.  Provide ICS 
training for employees. 
Finalize, implement, and 
review pandemic plan 
periodically. 
Finalize and implement the 
pandemic plan in a practical 
and timely manner to ensure 
that the water system is 
fully prepared to respond 




appropriate actions for the 
pandemic phase and 
external trigger point. 
Continuously monitor and 
assess implementation 
actions to ensure staying on 
target. 
Adjust plans as necessary. 
Review plans periodically, 
at least every 90 days 
initially and more 
frequently as the pandemic 
evolves. 
 
Identify potential costs 
associated with pandemic 
influenza. 
Evaluate budget impact of 
pandemic influenza. 
Develop funding policies 
and budget for pandemic 
influenza planning and 
response. 
Mutual aid. Discuss mutual aid with 
neighboring utilities, 
American Water Works 
Association and regulators. 
Develop mutual aid 
agreements. 




Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Plan for Water Systems Template 
A Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Plan template for water systems 
is included in appendix D.  The template was developed for this project based on existing 
plans and checklists from public health agencies, private industry, professional 
associations, government and water systems.  The template was designed so that action 
items related to stages of pandemic influenza are in the beginning sections of the plan for 
efficient access. Background information such as preparedness, hygiene, communication, 
and educational materials, is in later sections or appendices.   
The template can be used to develop a “stand alone” plan or it can be incorporated 
as an appendix in an existing “all hazards” emergency plan.  Because water systems are 
unique and vary in size, the template is scalable and can be easily modified to fit local 
circumstances.  The checklist for pandemic influenza planning in appendix E can be used 
to ensure that a system’s plan considers essential elements of preparedness, response, and 
recovery.  This checklist includes essential information from various regulatory, water 






Many of the larger water systems in Ohio that serve populations greater than 
20,000 are preparing for the potential of an influenza pandemic.  Twenty six percent of 
the Ohio water systems responding to the project survey indicated that they have 
developed a pandemic influenza preparedness plan.  Eighty-eight percent of the surveyed 
water systems either have a plan, are working on a plan or intend to develop a plan.    
A majority of the surveyed water systems (86%) were interested in obtaining 
training related to pandemic influenza preparedness and response.  This training could be 
arranged by professional organizations such as the American Water Works Association in 
partnership with the Ohio or U.S. Environmental Protection Agencies.  Training is 
essential to ensure proper response to man-made and natural disasters that could result in 
a significant disruption of service.   
An informed public responds better in emergencies and is less likely to create 
social disruption.  Water systems should ensure that the customers in their community 
receive emergency preparation information, especially regarding stockpiling water, food, 
and emergency supplies.  This information could be delivered as a water bill insert or in 
the annual Consumer Confidence Report. 
Ensuring that enough employees are available to perform essential services is 
seen as the most significant factor for maintaining continuity of operations.  Cross 
training for essential positions, sequestering critical employees, vaccination and other 
personal protection measures can help maintain an adequate level of staffing.  These 
measures represent multiple barriers to influenza caused disruptions which reflects the 
multi-barrier concept that water systems use to ensure safe drinking water.        
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Pandemic influenza plans for water systems could prove to be extremely valuable 
tools for ensuring that water systems are able to continue treating and pumping safe water 
in a sufficient quantity for drinking, sanitation, fire fighting, and commercial use during a 
pandemic.  In the event of a pandemic, communities will struggle with maintaining 
healthcare systems, infrastructure, transportation systems, businesses, and the provision 
of services.  A disruption in the supply of drinking water would be extremely disastrous 
for public health in a community already overwhelmed by pandemic influenza.     
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APPENDIX  B:  Survey Cover Letter and Questionnaire 
 





Dear Sir of Madam: 
 
     My name is Phil Van Atta.  I am conducting research to determine best practices for 
response and continuity of operations for water systems in the event of an influenza 
pandemic.  I work for the City of Dayton Water Department and I am a student in the 
Master of Public Health (MPH) program at Wright State University.  
 
     A pandemic flu epidemic could cause widespread illness and fatalities, and create 
major disruptions to the global economy and the operations of critical infrastructure, 
including drinking water systems.  I am conducting a survey of medium and large Ohio 
water utilities to determine the status of preparations for a potential influenza pandemic.  
This information will be used for background information for a MPH degree project.   
  
    You are invited to participate in this study.  The questionnaire is expected to take less 
than one minute to complete.  Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary and 
you may choose not to participate at any time without prejudice.  There are no risks 
anticipated from participating in this study.  Your participation in this study implies 
consent.  Any information given will be reported in general terms related to the size of 
population served.  The source of information provided will remain anonymous.  Your 
water system will not be identified in the study.   
 
    It is requested that surveys be returned by October 19, 2007 in the postage paid 
envelope.  You may request a copy of the findings by submitting a request to me at the 
address located below.  It is anticipated that the report will be available after November 
15, 2007. 
 
     If you have any general questions about giving consent or your rights as a research 
participant, in this research study, you can call the Wright State University Institutional 




Philip Van Atta      Sara Paton, Ph.D. 
Principal Investigator      Faculty Advisor 
Wright State University - MPH    Wright State University  
3235 Southern Blvd.      3235 Southern Blvd. 
Kettering, Ohio 45429     Kettering, Ohio 45429  
(937) 775- 5555      (937) 775- 5555 
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Water Utility Preparation for Pandemic Influenza Survey  
     I am conducting a survey of Ohio water utilities as part of a Master of Public Health 
degree project.  This project will include a paper that describes research of “best 
practices” for water utility response, including continuity of operations, in the event flu 
pandemic.   This survey will take less than five minutes to complete.  Your 
participation in this survey is greatly appreciated.  Please respond by October 19, 2007. 
The identity of survey respondents will remain confidential. 
Survey Questions 
1. How many water customers are served by your utility?   
     >200,000 ____ 
     100,000 – 199,999 _____ 
      50,000 – 99,999  ______ 
      20,000 – 49,999  ______ 
     
2. Is your water utility: 
    Publicly owned and operated? ____ 
    Publicly owned and privately operated? _____ 
    Privately owned and operated? ______ 
    Other (please describe) _______________________________________________ 
 
3. Number of employees in your water utility? __________ 
 
4. Does your utility have a Pandemic Influenza Plan?   Yes ____  No_____ 
 
5. What is the status of your utility’s preparation for Pandemic Influenza?   
    A Pandemic Flu Plan has been completed ____ 
    Currently working on a Pandemic Flu Plan 
    Intend to develop a Pandemic Flu Plan ______ 
    Pandemic Flu planning is part of the utility’s Emergency Response Plan ______ 
    Other (please describe)______________________________________________ 
 
6. Have your employees participated in training that is related to Pandemic Flu 
    planning and response?  
     Yes _____      No_____  
 
7. Would you or your employees be interested in participating in training that is related to  
     Pandemic Flu planning and response?  
     Yes _____      No_____ 
  





APPENDIX C:    Public Health Competencies Achieved During Project 
(Source: Competencies Project, Council on Linkages, April, 2001) 
 
Domain 1: Analytic Assessment  
Specific Competencies Description of Completion 
1. Defines a problem Water systems don’t have a template to facilitate 
development of pandemic influenza plan. 
2. Identifies relevant and 
appropriate data and 
information sources. 
Literature search included recognized authorities for 
pandemic preparedness; WHO,CDC, FEMA, U.S. 
Dept. of Homeland Security, state and local health 
agencies.  Also researched and spoke to recognized 
experts for water system preparedness; EPA, AWWA, 
AMWA, and emergency preparedness coordinators. 
3. Identify gaps in data 
sources. 
Discovered that public health agencies have scant 
information about disruptions to water or other 
utilities in their emergency plans. 
4. Apply ethical principles 
to the collection, etc. of data 
and information. 
Confidentiality was maintained for all sources of 
survey data. 
5. Obtains and interprets 
information regarding risks 
and benefits to the 
community. 
Project discussed how pandemic influenza planning 
and preparedness by water systems would benefit 
communities.  
 
Domain 2: Policy Development/Program Planning Skills 
Specific Competencies Description of Completion 
6. Collects, summarizes, and 
interprets information 
relevant to an issue. 
A survey was used to collect information from Ohio 
water systems to determine the status of preparedness 
for pandemic influenza. 
7. Prepares and implements 
emergency response plans. 
This project resulted in a template pandemic influenza 
plan and a plan for the City of Dayton Water 
Department. 
8. Develops mechanisms to 
monitor and evaluate 
programs for their 
effectiveness and quality. 
Best practices were developed to allow evaluations of 
pandemic influenza planning for water systems. 






Phone discussions and email communications were 
conducted with emergency preparedness coordinators, 
public health officials, regulators, water associations, 






Domain 3: Communication   
Specific Competencies Description of Completion 
  
10. Presents information 
accurately 
Sources of pandemic influenza information were the 
World Health Organization and the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. 
 
Domain 5: Community Dimensions 
Specific Competencies Description of Completion 
11. Establishes and 
maintains linkages with key 
stakeholders. 
Initiated partnership with local public health and 
regulatory officials for pandemic preparedness. 
 
Domain 6: Basic Public Health Sciences  
Specific Competencies Description of Completion 
12. Applies basic 
environmental health 
principals  
Describes the relationship between drinking water, 
sanitation, and community health. 
13. Identifies and retrieves 
current relevant scientific 
evidence. 
Retrieved current scientific papers describing 
pandemic influenza viruses and control of pandemics.  
Also, retrieved papers discussing the risk of influenza 
viruses to drinking water sources. 
 
Domain 8: Leadership and Systems Thinking  
Specific Competencies Description of Completion 
14. Identifies internal and 
external issues that may 
impact delivery of essential 
public health services. 
Notes that disruptions of water systems caused by 
pandemics could affect community health and 
overwhelm public health services.  Also, notes that loss 
of water in public health facilities would impact 
delivery of public health services. 
15. Facilitates collaboration 
of internal and external 
groups to ensure 
participation of key 
stakeholders. 
Project initiated contacts with local public health and 
regulatory officials for participation in future training 
and continued communication between stakeholders. 
16. Promotes team and 
organizational learning. 
Manuscript and template plan describe the importance 
of team training and ongoing education for water 
system employees. 
17. Contributes to 
development, 
implementation, and 
monitoring of organizational 
performance standards. 
Best practices and a checklist were developed to 






APPENDIX D: Water System Pandemic Influenza COOP Plan Template 
 
 
     The following template provides a structure for formulating a Pandemic Influenza 
Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan based on guidelines from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and information from other sources.  Sources of pandemic 
influenza information include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
U.S. government pandemic influenza planning documents, including the pandemicflu.gov 
website, and the World Health Organization.   
     The template can be used to develop a “stand alone” plan or it can be incorporated as 
an appendix in an existing “all hazards” emergency plan.  Some existing water system 
plans can be used as sources of information for the pandemic influenza plan, e.g. “Strike 
Plans” could be used to prepare for employee shortages.  Water utilities can modify the 
pandemic influenza template to meet their own needs and requirements.   Divisions, 
bureaus, laboratories, etc. within water utilities should develop specific actions relevant 
to their unique activities.  These action plans could be attached as annexes to an overall 










INFLUENZA PANDEMIC  





City of _________ Water Department 
 
 
(LOGO HERE)  
 
 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 














The City of ___________ Water Department has operations that must be performed, or 
rapidly and efficiently resumed, in an emergency.  While the impact of an emergency 
cannot be predicted, planning for operations under such conditions can mitigate the 
impact of the emergency on our people, our facilities and our mission. 
This continuity of operations plan (COOP) is designed to ensure that essential operations 
can be performed during an influenza pandemic.  These operations are the foundation 
upon which the COOP is built.  Continuity of Operations Plans for man-made or natural 
disasters are important resources in providing essential services to our customers during 
an emergency.  Utilities can develop continuity of operations plans for all-hazards or for 
specific situations, e.g. “Strike Plans”.  
This template provides a structure for formulating a Pandemic Influenza Continuity of 
Operations (COOP) Plan based on guidelines from the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency and information from other sources.  Sources of pandemic influenza information 
include the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. government 
pandemic influenza planning documents, including the pandemicflu.gov website, and the 
World Health Organization.   
Water utilities are encouraged to modify this template to meet their own needs and 
requirements.   Divisions, bureaus, laboratories, etc. within water utilities should develop 
specific actions relevant to their unique activities.  These action plans could be attached 
as annexes to the overall Pandemic Influenza COOP. 
Necessary actions to take during different stages of pandemic influenza are located 
in Section 3.0 of the plan.  Later sections of the plan provide details and background 
information. 
This plan will be updated periodically as required to incorporate new 
directives/strategies, new information technology, legislative changes, and procedural 
changes based on lessons learned and best practices identified during exercises and actual 
events.  A full review, update, and approval of the plan will be conducted annually.  
Revised plans will be distributed to the appropriate individuals. 
 
Instructions and a template for developing general continuity of operations plans 
can be downloaded at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) website 
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Flu pandemics occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968.  Public health and medical experts 
at the World Health Organization (WHO) and elsewhere believe that another pandemic 
could occur at any time.  Pandemics occur when an influenza virus with severe health 
effects undergoes genetic shift and human to human transmission occurs readily.  There 
is concern among public health officials that the avian influenza virus H5N1 could 
undergo genetic changes and cause a pandemic.   
Avian influenza viruses can spread between wild birds and domestic birds.  Migratory 
waterfowl can infect other birds directly or through fecal contamination of water used by 
domestic birds.  Currently, human avian influenza H5N1 cases are associated with close 
contact with contaminated chickens and other poultry.  There is some evidence indicating 
that limited, non-sustained human-human transmission of H5N1 may have occurred.  If 
H5N1 undergoes genetic shift and becomes easily transmissible between humans, 
pandemic influenza could spread rapidly.  Because of increased global commerce and 
international travel, diseases can now spread rapidly throughout the world which would 
likely make a pandemic in the 21
st
 century much more deadly than in the past. 
Avian Influenza virus H5N1 has a high mortality rate.  High mortality rates and rapid 
human to human transmission differentiate pandemic influenza from “normal” seasonal 
influenza.  As of January 3, 2008 there were 348 human cases of H5N1 influenza world 
wide with a death rate of 62%.   These cases were mostly confined to Asia with other 
cases in the Middle East and Africa.  Public health officials track these H5N1 cases in 
addition to tracking of “normal” seasonal influenza cases. 
A Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) study of disease rates for a new 
pandemic estimated that in the United States, 40 – 100 million people could be sickened.  
The CDC study provided a “most likely estimate” death toll of 89,000 – 300,000, with 
“best case” to “worst case” death toll range of 75,000 – 422,000.    
It is considered unlikely that properly treated drinking water can serve as a mode of 
transmission for the H5N1 virus.  However, a pandemic caused by an influenza virus 
could cause serious disruptions to the operations of drinking water systems.  These 
disruptions could be caused by staffing shortages, power disruptions, and shortages of 
chemicals and other supplies.  Protecting employee health is vital for continuing 
operations, especially if another emergency, e.g. flooding, occurs during an influenza 
pandemic.  Ensuring continuity of operations for drinking water systems is crucial to 
protect public health and safety, and to the economy of all communities.    
     Plans for maintaining essential functions and services in a pandemic influenza must 
emphasize and implement procedures such as social distancing techniques, infection 
control and personal hygiene, cross-training, and telecommuting.  Protecting the health 
and safety of employees must be a major focus of planning in order to ensure the 
continuity of essential functions.  Vaccines and antiviral medications will be important 
tools for reducing the impact of influenza pandemics.  However, a virus specific vaccine 






1.1 Definitions (from www.pandemicflu.gov) 
 
Avian (or bird) flu is caused by influenza viruses that occur naturally among wild 
birds.  The H5N1 avian flu virus is deadly to domestic fowl and can be transmitted 
from birds to humans.  There is no human immunity and no vaccine is available. 
 
Pandemic influenza is virulent human flu that causes a global outbreak, or 
pandemic, of serious illness.  Because there is little natural immunity, the disease can 
spread easily from person to person.  Currently, there is no pandemic flu. 
 
Seasonal (or common) flu is a respiratory illness that can be transmitted from person 
to person.  Most people have some immunity, and a vaccine is available. 
  
Social Distancing are measures to increase the space between people and decrease 
the frequency of contact among people. 
 
Teleworking (or Telecommuting) is working from home or an alternate site and 





The purpose of this plan is to provide information and action steps for preparation, 
response, and recovery in the event of pandemic influenza.  This plan should be used in 
conjunction with existing emergency plans. 
 
 
3.0 PANDEMIC ALERT LEVELS AND ACTIONS 
 
3.1 Pandemic Phases, Stages, and Water System Alert Levels 
 
     The (insert utility name) will implement its Pandemic Influenza COOP in response 
to changes or “triggers” in the Federal Government (U.S.) Response Stages.  Preparation 
and actions are listed in Section 3.2 of this plan.  Notification of various stages and 
actions will follow the normal chain of command.  Managers and supervisors will be 
responsible for implementation following the normal chain of command.  Details of 
preparations and response actions are listed in later sections of this plan.   
 
     As of January 3, 2008 the World Health Organization list the current global pandemic 
status as Phase 3 which corresponds with “No or very limited human-to-human 
transmission”.  The U.S. government classifies the current pandemic status as Stage 0 
which relates to “New domestic animal outbreak in at risk country”.  It is currently 
believed that limited human to human transmission of H5N1 influenza may have 
occurred in Asia.   Table 1 shows the relationship between Federal Government Stages, 
World Health Organization Phases, and suggested alert levels for water systems. 
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Table 1 – Relation between Water System “Alert Levels” and Pandemic Stages/Phases 
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Pandemic Period 





























































Alert Level A 
Water System 
Pandemic 















Note: The relationship between WHO Phases 1 - 3 and U.S. Stages 0 - 2 is approximate.  
WHO Phase 3 begins while U.S. Stage 0, “New domestic animal outbreaks in at-risk 




3.2  Pandemic Planning  
 
     Table 2, “Pandemic Planning and Preparation”, indicates suggested actions for water 
systems to undertake in preparation for pandemic influenza.  Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 in 









Table 2 – Pandemic Planning and Preparation 
 
Pandemic Planning and Preparation 






Water System Action 
 
Completed 
 Identify critical functions that must be kept in operation.  
 Identify critical supplies, e.g. chlorine, necessary to 
maintain safe water. 
 
 Identify essential personnel.  
 Identify cross training needs and conduct cross training.  
 Develop pandemic influenza plan.  
 Participate in pandemic influenza planning and exercises 
with local public health and regulatory officials. 
 
 Consider developing mutual aid agreements.  
 Update Standard Operating Procedures for plant operations 
and other essential functions. 
 
 Define roles and responsibilities for all personnel during a 
pandemic. 
 
 Educate all employees regarding pandemic policy (changes 
in work rules, etc.), infection control measures (hygiene 
measures, use of N-95 masks, etc) and flu symptoms. 
 
 Plan for supply disruptions: Develop alternate treatment 
chemicals, supplies, and power. 
 
 Acquire supplies for sanitizing and personal protection: 
sanitizing stations, sanitizing agents, latex/vinyl gloves, 
and N-95 masks. 
 
 Develop emergency supply kits (food, water, PPE) to 
critical facilities. 
 
 Ensure IT system is capable for telecommuting and 
provide secure access to appropriate employees. 
 
 Establish necessary pandemic policies: Emergency 
communications, travel, social distancing, telecommuting, 
sequestering critical staff on-site, screening employees for 
influenza, sick leave (for sending employees home that 
have exceeded sick leave limits or have no accrued sick 
leave). 
 
 Encourage employees to receive annual influenza 
vaccinations and to stay home when they have influenza. 
 
 Set up pandemic influenza surveillance notification system 
with local public health officials. 
 
 Reserve funds for emergency purchases at increased costs.  
 Encourage employees and public to develop home 
emergency kits (food, water, etc.) and plans. 
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3.3 TRIGGERS – Water System Actions in Response to Pandemic Stages 
 
 
Table 3 – Alert Level A – Pre-Pandemic Actions 
 
Alert Level A – Pre-Pandemic Preparation 








 Remind employees regarding pandemic policy (changes in 
work rules, etc.) and infection control measures (hygiene 
measures, use of N-95 masks, etc) and flu symptoms. 
 
 Review preparations for supply disruptions and staffing 
shortages (cross training and alternate treatment chemicals, 
suppliers, and backup power systems. 
 
 Set up sanitizing stations and provide work areas with 
sanitizing agents, latex/vinyl gloves, and N-95 masks. 
 
 Distribute emergency supply kits (food, water, personal 
protection equipment) to critical facilities. 
 
 Establish or finalize necessary pandemic policies: 
Emergency communications, travel, social distancing, 
telecommuting, sequestering critical staff on-site, screening 
employees for influenza, sick leave (for sending employees 
home that have exceeded sick leave limits or have no 
accrued sick leave). 
 
 Encourage employees to receive annual influenza 
vaccinations and to stay home when they have influenza. 
 
 
 Monitor pandemic status through pandemicflu.gov and local 
public health.  
 
 
 Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine, 
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies. 
 
 
















Table 4 – Alert Level B – Pandemic Actions 
 
Alert Level B – Pandemic 
(Widespread human outbreaks in multiple locations overseas  








 Communicate pandemic status, and provide infection control 
and symptoms of flu refresher training to all employees. 
 
 




 Implement influenza screening (based on symptoms) of 
employees. 
 
 Suspend all travel. 
 
 
 Focus on conducting essential functions only. 
 
 
 Prepare to implement necessary pandemic policies for social 
distancing, telecommuting, sequestering critical staff on-site, 
screening employees for influenza, sick leave (for sending 
employees home that have exceeded sick leave limits or 
have no accrued sick leave). 
 
 Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine, 
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies. 
 
 Prevent access to facilities by non-employees unless 
necessary. 
 
 Prepare for use of cross trained employees. 
 
 
 Review line of succession plans and update as necessary. 
 
 
 Continue to monitor pandemic status through 
pandemicflu.gov and local public health. 
 
 
 Provide supplies at facilities for sequestering essential staff. 
 
 











Table 5 – Alert Level C – Pandemic Actions 
 
Alert Level C – Pandemic  








 Communicate pandemic status to all employees. 
 
 
 Focus on conducting essential functions only. 
 
 




 Continue influenza screening (based on symptoms) of 
employees. 
 




 Reassign staff to insufficiently staffed facilities. 
 
 
 Consider sequestering essential personnel at facilities. 
 
 
 Provide daily absentee reports to Manager. 
 
 
 Suspend all travel. 
 
 
 Eliminate all non-essential face to face meetings. 
 
 
 Provide transportation to employees as necessary. 
 
 
 Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine, 
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies. 
 
 
 Continue to monitor pandemic status through 
pandemicflu.gov and local public health. 
 
 





Keep records of employees that have recovered from 
influenza.  They will be vital for maintaining operations 








Table 6 – Alert Level D – Pandemic Recovery and Preparation Actions 
 
Alert Level D – Pandemic Recovery and Preparation 












 Communicate pandemic status to all employees. 
 
 
 Stockpile essential supplies. 
 
 
 Allow necessary travel on a case by case basis. 
 
 
 Maintain contact with critical supply vendors, e.g. chlorine, 
electric, gas, to determine their ability to deliver supplies. 
 
 
 Restock supplies at facilities for sequestering essential staff. 
 
 
 Evaluate response and update plans. 
 
 
 Continue to monitor pandemic status through 
pandemicflu.gov and local public health. 
 
 
 Document actions and additional expenses. 
 
 




 Keep records of employees that have recovered from 
influenza.  They will be vital for maintaining operations 

















4.0 PANDEMIC PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS 
 
These assumptions are adopted from the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
Implementation Plan and Business Continuity Planning Assumptions for Influenza 
Pandemics from the North American Electric Reliability Council.     
 
 
4.1 GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS  
 
1. An influenza pandemic will occur in the future but timing of the outbreak is 
uncertain.  
2.  Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal.  
3. Efficient and sustained person-to-person transmission signals an imminent 
pandemic. 
4. The clinical disease attack rate will likely be 30 percent or higher in the overall 
population during the pandemic.  Illness rates will be highest among school-aged 
children (about 40 percent) and decline with age.  Among working adults, an 
average of 20 percent will become ill during a community outbreak.  Some 
persons will become infected but not develop clinically significant symptoms.  
Asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic individuals can transmit infection and 
develop immunity to subsequent infection. 
5. Of those who become ill with influenza, 50 percent will seek outpatient medical 
care.  With the availability of effective antiviral drugs for treatment, this 
proportion may be higher in the next pandemic. 
6. The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the virulence of the 
pandemic virus.  Estimates differ about 10-fold between more and less severe 
scenarios.  Two scenarios are presented based on extrapolation of past pandemic 
experience (Table 7).  Planning should include the more severe scenario.  Risk 
groups for severe and fatal infection cannot be predicted with certainty but are 





7. Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the pandemic. In a severe 
pandemic, absenteeism attributable to illness, the need to care for ill family 
members, and fear of infection may reach 40 percent during the peak weeks of a 
community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before 
and after the peak.  Certain public health measures (closing schools, quarantining 
household contacts of infected individuals, “snow days”) are likely to increase 
rates of absenteeism. 
8. The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms) 
for influenza is approximately two days. 
9. Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for up to one 
day before the onset of symptoms.  Viral shedding and the risk of transmission 
will be greatest during the first two days of illness.  Children usually shed the 
greatest amount of virus and therefore are likely to post the greatest risk for 
transmission. 
10. On average, infected persons will transmit infection to approximately two other 
people. 
11. A pandemic outbreak in any given community will last about six to eight weeks 
for each wave of the pandemic. 
12. Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across the 
country) of illness could occur with each wave lasting two-three months.  
Historically, the largest waves have occurred in the fall and winter, but the 
seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty. 
13. The stages of the pandemic should occur sequentially, though they may overlap or 
occur so rapidly as to appear to be occurring simultaneously or being skipped.  
For example, the pandemic could spread so rapidly that Federal Government 
Response Stages 3 and 4 may be activated simultaneously or the status could 






Table 7: Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death Associated 
with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios in the United States* 
 
Characteristic Moderate Pandemic 
(similar to 1957, 1968) 
Severe Pandemic 
(similar to 1918) 
Illness 90 million (30%) 90 million (30%) 
Outpatient Medical Care 45 million (50%) 45 million (50%) 
Hospitalization 865,000 9,900,000 
ICU Care 128,750 1,485,000 
Mechanical Ventilation 64,875 745,500 
Deaths 209,000 1,903,000 
 
*Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States.  Note that 
these estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available during 
the 20th century pandemics. 
 
 
4.2 _ (Insert Water Utility Name) ASSUMPTIONS 
           (Sample text) 
1. Source water pumping, complete water treatment, treated water pumping and 
(other critical functions) will remain operational during a pandemic influenza 
outbreak. 
2. Alternate facilities may be activated for use during a pandemic to separate staff, 
i.e. implement social distancing protocols.  A pandemic influenza event does not 
necessarily require the use of alternate facilities. 
3. Essential functions, operations and support requirements will continue to be 
people-dependent.  Social distancing, hygiene, health screening and other 
measures may need to be implemented to protect the utility’s work force. 
4. Disruptions of power and supplies, transportation restrictions, and staffing 
reductions could affect the performance of essential functions.  
5. Water utilities must be prepared to rely on their own resources.  The widespread 
effects of pandemic influenza would impact mutual aid from other utilities. 
 
 
5.0 PANDEMIC RESPONSE TEAM AND COORDINATOR  
 
(Water utility name) has designated (insert name or position) as the Pandemic 
Coordinator.  The (insert utility name and position) shall serve as the Alternate 
Pandemic Coordinator.  (Insert name or position) will establish a Pandemic Response 
Team (PRT) to anticipate the impacts of a pandemic on (utility name) and to assist with 
developing strategies to manage the effects of a pandemic outbreak.   Each Division (or 






6.0    ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS  
 
6.1 Essential Functions 
 
    Table 8 is an example list of essential functions with associated employees.  In order to 
minimize the effects of a pandemic on staff and essential functions, (insert utility name) 
will emphasize and implement procedures such as social distancing techniques, infection 
control and personal hygiene, and cross-training.  (Primary employees (currently perform 
these functions) and backup employees (cross trained, recently retired, etc.) should be 
determined as part of pandemic planning.)   
 
Table 8:  Example - Essential Functions and Supporting Information 
 





1 Water Treatment   
2 Pumping   
2 Water Treatment and Pumping 
Equipment Repair 
  
3 Distribution System Water Testing   




7.0    CRITICAL POSITIONS AND MINIMUM STAFFING LEVELS  
 
7.1  Identification of Essential Positions and Skills 
 
The (insert utility name) shall identify positions, skills, and personnel needed to continue 
essential functions and services.  Back-up personnel will also be identified and cross-
trained. (The utility may decide to attach “Essential Personnel” stickers on the back of ID 
badges for security and screening of non-essential personnel.) 
 Annex (insert if applicable) of the (insert utility name) COOP Plan identifies those 
personnel needed to support continuity of operations in all-hazards scenarios. 
 




Employee Skills Certifications/ 
Qualifications 
Water Plant Operator 
(Maintenance) 
 Water Treatment 
Laboratory 
Plumbing 
Water Operator III 
Water Analyst I 
Pump Repair License 
Laboratory Analyst 
(Water Plant Operator) 
 Can repair anything Water Operator III 
Water Analyst III 
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8.0    CROSS TRAINING AND ALTERNATE WORK ARRANGEMENTS 
 
8.1 Cross Training 
 
Employees will be cross-trained in advance of pandemics so that back-up workers are 
available for essential functions.  Employees in non-essential and essential positions will 
be trained to perform essential tasks that are not part of their job description.  Discussions 
should be held with unions and human resource departments to prepare for these 
situations.  Table 9 provides a list of primary and backup employees. 
 
8.2 Alternate Work Schedules 
 
Regular work schedules may be modified in the event of a pandemic.  Departments 
should review normal work schedules and determine how they can be modified to 
promote social distancing and continuity of operations.  During pandemics, overtime is 
probable but meal and rest periods will still be required.  Notification periods in 
collective bargaining agreements may be suspended. 
 
8.3  Telework Policy 
    Telework, aka Telecommuting can be an integral part of plans and procedures to 
maintain essential functions and services in an influenza pandemic.  (insert utility name) 
shall analyze its current IT capability for teleworking and identify which personnel can 
perform essential functions by teleworking during a pandemic.   (insert  name or 
position) shall develop and evaluate telework plans, procedures, and capabilities through 
reviews, testing, post-incident reports, lessons learned, performance evaluations, and 
exercises.  Procedures shall be established to ensure that corrective action is taken on any 
deficiency identified in the evaluation process. 
 
(List pre-identified tasks and/or jobs) can be done remotely during a pandemic.  (If 
applicable state, “Employees in these positions and their alternates have been 
enabled with the appropriate security to access electronic networks and work from 
home.”)    (If applicable, insert, attach or reference Telework Plan here.) 
 
 
9.0 EMPLOYEE HEALTH PROTECTION 
 
9.1 Vaccinations and Antiviral Medications 
 
Employees should be encouraged to receive annual seasonal vaccinations.  These 
vaccinations could protect the health of their work force before a pandemic.    
Establishing a relationship in advance with local public health officials could facilitate 
the distribution of anti-virals and vaccines to water system personnel.  Prioritization of 
vaccination and antivirals distribution follows guidance from the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan.  In accordance with guidance from 
the Public utility personnel are in Tier 2, subtier B for vaccinations and Tier 8 for 
antivirals distribution   
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Antivirals must be taken within 48 hours of symptoms to be effective (CDC).  The 
current potential pandemic virus, H5N1 is resistant to amantadine and rimantadine, but 
oseltamavir and zanamavir would probably be effective (pandemicflu.gov). 
 
9.2 Personal Protective Equipment and Supplies to Stockpile  
 
Advance training and “just-in-time” training should be provided to employees regarding 
infection control measures.  The following infection control supplies should be provided 
or made available at all times to employees: 
- Soap and paper towels within washrooms 
- Soap and paper towels within kitchen areas 
- Hand sanitizer stations at various work areas 
- Tissues 
- Disinfectant spray for surfaces 
- Extra trash cans and garbage bags for tissue disposal 
- Personal Protective Equipment: Vinyl/latex gloves, N95 masks 
 
9.3 Basic Hygiene 
 
Employees shall be educated and reminded of hygiene measures to prevent the spread of 
disease: 
- Cover coughs and sneeze with a tissue (or into shirt sleeve if necessary). 
- During pandemics: Avoid hand shaking (use alternatives like nodding, elbow 
bumping, etc.). 
- Keep work area and home clean and disinfected. 
- Stay home when ill. 
- Wash hands often, especially before eating (or touching near mouth, nose or 
eyes). 
- Wash hands before and after smoking. 




During a pandemic workplace cleaning measures will be required on a daily basis to 
minimize transmission of influenza virus through hard surfaces (counters, door knobs, 
etc.).  Thorough cleaning should be performed before disinfection, especially for the 
work areas of an ill employee.  Disinfectants that can inactivate viruses should be used.  
Influenza viruses may live up to two days on surfaces.  Employees should wear a mask 
and gloves when cleaning and disinfecting.  The gloves and masks should be discarded 
afterwards.   Hands must be washed and sanitized after the procedure.  
 
9.5 Travel Restrictions and Social Distancing 
 
Social Distancing are measures to increase the space between people and decrease the 
frequency of contact among people.  Travel will be restricted or eliminated according to 
plans for alert levels A, B, and C.   
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Alert Level A (confirmed human cases overseas) – Travel is restricted to in-state only.   
 
Alert Level B and C (widespread human outbreaks in multiple locations overseas - first 
human cases in North America) – All travel is suspended. 
 
Alert Level D (preparation for next pandemic wave) – Necessary travel evaluated on 
case by case basis. 
 
9.6 Employee Influenza Screening  
 
Supervisors may rely on observations of employee symptoms to determine if an 
employee has influenza.   These symptoms include: 
- Fever 
- Cough 
- Sore throat 
- Muscle aches 
- Eye infections (conjunctivitis) 
- Pneumonia 
- Acute respiratory distress 
     
9.7 Ill Employees 
 
Employees with influenza symptoms should be isolated and sent home as soon as 
possible to prevent the spread of influenza.  When the employee’s condition improves to 
the point where the employee no longer poses a health hazard to fellow employees, the 
employee shall contact his or her supervisor and arrange for the employee’s return to 
work. 
 
Treatment of employees with influenza will be problematic because the health care 
system will be overwhelmed by a pandemic.  Records should be kept of employees who 
have recovered from pandemic influenza.  These employees will be vital for operations 
because of their acquired immunity. 
 
 
10.0   CHAIN OF SUPPLY  
 
10.1 Essential Contract and Support Services and Other Interdependencies 
 
To prepare for pandemic influenza:  
Existing inventory will be supplemented to keep essential services functioning for 7 days 
or more.  Vendors of critical products and services shall be identified.  Discussions with 
vendors shall include vendor plans for ongoing services and/or shipments in the event of 
absences, shortages, or disruptions in transportation systems.  (insert utility name) shall 
initiate pre-solicited, signed and standing agreements with contractors and other third 
parties to ensure fulfillment of supply and service requirements.  
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(Insert utility name) shall develop relationships with more than one supplier should a 
primary contractor be unable to provide the required service.  Table 10 is a sample chart 




Table 10:  Example - Essential Contractual Arrangement and Interdependencies 
 
Essential Supply  
or Service 
Primary Contractor 
And Contact Info. 
Back-up Contractor 
And Contact Info. 
Chlorine   
Water Main Repair   
   
 
 
11.0   HUMAN RESOURCES & UNION CONTRACT ISSUES  
 
Discussions should be held with unions and human resource departments to prepare for  
alternate work arrangements that may be implemented during pandemics.   
 
 
12.0   COMMUNICATION PLAN  
 
Communications Plan 
(insert utility name) shall develop a Communications Plan and mechanisms to provide 
relevant information to internal and external stakeholders, including but not limited to 
instructions for determining the status of agency operations and possible changes in 
working conditions and operational hours.   
(Insert plan or refer to location of existing Communications Plan)  
 
According to the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Guidance, 
workplace risk can be minimized through implementation of systems and technologies 
that facilitate communication without person-to-person contact.   
 
 
13.0   DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY & NIMS  
 
     At the height of a pandemic wave, absenteeism may reach a peak of 40 percent. As 
such, delegations of authority are critical.   (insert utility name) shall plan for 
delegations of authority that are at least three deep per responsibility to help assure 
continuity of operations over an extended time period, i.e., 30-60-90 days. 
 
All employees should receive National Incident Management System training.   
Supervisors and managers should be certified at IC 300 and 400 levels. 
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14.0   INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY PANDEMIC PREPARATION  
 
Essential personal should have family care succession plans in place to ensure that they 
can report to work if schools are closed, family members are ill, etc.  All employees 
should receive educational materials that describe pandemic influenza protection 
measures for families.  These materials are in Appendix F of this plan. 
 
 
15.0   PANDEMIC PREPARATION TRAINING 
  
15.1  Testing, Training, Exercises 
Testing, training, and exercising are essential to assessing, demonstrating, and improving 
the ability of organizations to maintain their essential functions and services. 
 
15.2  Social Distancing 
(insert utility name) shall conduct annual tests, training, and exercises to ensure 
sustainable social distancing techniques, including telecommuting capabilities, and to 
assess the impacts of reduced staff on the performance of essential functions. 
 
15.3  Tabletop, Functional, and Full-Scale Exercises 
(insert utility name) shall conduct annual pandemic exercises (tabletop, functional, or 
full scale) to examine the impacts of pandemic influenza on essential functions, to 
familiarize personnel with their responsibilities, and to validate the effectiveness of 
pandemic influenza COOP planning by senior leadership. 
(Attach Testing, Training and Exercise Plan in appendix.)  
 
15.4  Annual Awareness Training 




15.5  Cross-Training Successors and Back-up Personnel 
(insert utility name) shall identify and train back-up personnel, by position, needed to 






(Note:  Utilities can use manuscript Appendix E for the “Template Appendix A”.  
Spreadsheets or tables with utility specific information should be developed and used for 
Appendices B, C, D, and E.  Materials for “Template Appendix F can be obtained from 





Template APPENDIX A - Water Utility Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist 
(In Appendix E of manuscript.) 
 
 
Template APPENDIX B – Essential Functions and Resources (Personnel, equipment, 








Template APPENDIX D – Inventory of Supplies (Utility specific information) 
 
 




Template APPENDIX F – Educational Materials (Obtain from Local Public Health 
Agency) 
Frequently asked questions about pandemic influenza 


























APPENDIX E:  Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist 
 
 
Water Utility Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist 
 
 
The following checklist is a modified version of a pandemic flu checklists developed by the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services and Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention.  It identifies specific activities that water utilities can take to prepare for a pandemic 
flu event.  This checklist can be modified to cover unique circumstances relating to your utility.  
Some items on the checklist may be covered by existing all-hazards, emergency response plans.    
 
 
Pandemic Response Coordinator: _________________________    Date: ________________ 
 







   
Identify a pandemic coordinator and/or team with defined roles and responsibilities 
for preparedness and response planning. Include input from all management levels 
and staff that are involved in day-to-day operations. 
   Identify critical functions that must be maintained, e.g. disinfection. 
   
Identify essential personnel functions and critical inputs needed to maintain 
operations, including locations where they may be needed during a pandemic. 
Ensure there is redundancy in terms of personnel (cross-training), materials 
(chemical suppliers, equipment suppliers, etc.), communication (phones, radios, 
etc.), information technology, and power (electric, gas). Establish contingency 
agreements with other utilities (gas, electric) where feasible. 
   
Identify key customers and customers with special needs, such as hospitals and 
nursing homes, and ensure services can be provided.  
   
Cross train employees to provide backups for critical positions.  Train and prepare 
an ancillary workforce (e.g. contractors and retirees). Develop mutual aid contacts 
through with other utilities through a Water Agency Response Network (WARN) or 
other means. 
   
Develop and plan for scenarios likely to result in an increase or decrease in demand 
on your facilities during a pandemic (Loss of tourism, consumers at home instead 
of work, etc.) 
   
Determine the potential impact of a pandemic on utility-related travel (e.g. 
quarantines, border closures that limit availability of chemicals), including suppliers 
who make deliveries.  Encourage suppliers to develop their own pandemic 
influenza continuity of operations plans. 
   
Find up-to-date, reliable pandemic information from the local public health agency 








   
Establish an emergency communications plan and revise it periodically. The plan 
should include identification of key contacts (with back-ups), chain of 
communications (including suppliers and key customers), and processes for 
tracking and communicating utility operational status and status of employees. 
Ensure public notification procedures are in place for potential scenarios.   
 
   
Implement an exercise/drill to test your plan, and revise it periodically.  Ensure that 
exercises include the participation or cooperation of local health agencies, 
emergency planning officials and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
NOTES: 
 







   
Forecast and allow for employee absences during a pandemic due to factors such 
as personal illness, family member illness, community containment measures and 
quarantines, school and/or business closures, and public transportation closures. 
   
Implement guidelines to limit the frequency and type of face-to-face contact (e.g. 
hand-shaking, meetings, office layout, shared workstations) among employees 
and between employees and customers. Take into consideration delivery 
personnel who would interact with employees.  (See CDC recommendations.) 
   
Encourage and track annual influenza vaccination for employees.  Consult local 
public health pandemic coordinators regarding pandemic vaccination and 
distribution of antiviral medications. 
   
Evaluate employee access to and availability of healthcare services during a 
pandemic, and improve services as needed. 
   
Evaluate employee access to and availability of mental health and social services 
during a pandemic, including corporate, community, and faith-based resources, 
and improve services as needed. 
   
Identify employees and key customers with special needs, and incorporate the 
requirements of such persons into your preparedness plan. 
NOTES: 







   
Establish policies for employee attendance, sick-leave absences and 
compensation unique to a pandemic (e.g. non-punitive, liberal leave), including 
policies on when a previously ill person is no longer infectious and can return to 
work after illness. 
   
Establish policies for flexible worksite (e.g. telecommuting) and flexible work 
hours (e.g. staggered shifts).  Take into account that longer shifts and onsite 
sleeping accommodations may reduce potential exposure to key workers.  
Consider needs and conditions (food, sleeping accommodations, family 






   
Establish policies for preventing influenza spread at the worksite (e.g. promoting 
respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette, sanitizer stations, disinfecting work areas 
and break rooms, and prompt exclusion of people with influenza symptoms). 
 
   
Establish policies for employees who have been exposed to pandemic influenza, 
are suspected to be ill, or become ill at the worksite (e.g. infection control 
response, immediate mandatory sick leave). 
   
Establish policies for teleconferencing and videoconferencing to limit face to face 
contact.   
   
Establish policies for travel to affected geographic areas and guidance for 
employees returning from affected areas (refer to CDC travel recommendations).   
   
Set up authorities, triggers, and procedures for activating and terminating the 
utility’s response plan. 







   
Provide sufficient and accessible infection control supplies (e.g. alcohol sanitizer 
stations, tissues, N-95 facial masks and receptacles for their disposal) at all work-
related locations. 
   
Enhance communications and information technology infrastructures as needed to 
support employee telecommuting and remote customer access. 
   Ensure availability of medical consultation and advice for emergency response. 
NOTES: 







   
Develop and disseminate programs and materials covering pandemic 
fundamentals (e.g. signs and symptoms of influenza, modes of transmission), 
personal and family protection and response strategies (e.g. hand hygiene, use of 
N-95 masks, coughing/sneezing etiquette, contingency plans). 
   
Anticipate employee fear and anxiety, rumors and misinformation and plan 
communications accordingly. 
   Ensure that communications are culturally and linguistically appropriate. 
   
Disseminate information to employees about your pandemic preparedness and 
response plan. 
   Provide information for the at-home care of ill employees and family members. 
   
Develop platforms (e.g. hotlines, dedicated websites) for communicating 
pandemic status and actions to employees, vendors, suppliers, and customers 
inside and outside the worksite in a consistent and timely way, including 
redundancies in the emergency contact system. 
   
Identify community sources for timely and accurate pandemic information 
(domestic and international) and resources for obtaining counter-measures (e.g. 














   
Collaborate with insurers, health plans, and major local healthcare facilities to 
share your pandemic plans and understand their capabilities and plans. 
   
Collaborate with local public health officials, Environmental Protection Agency 
officials and/or emergency responders; participate in their planning and training, 
share your pandemic plans, and understand their capabilities (e.g. surveillance) 
and plans.   
   
Communicate with local and/or state public health agencies and/or emergency 
responders about the assets and/or services your utility may be able to contribute 
to the community. 
   
Share pandemic continuity of operations best practices with other utilities and 

































APPENDIX F: Sources of Best Practices for Pandemic Influenza Continuity of 
Operations Plans for Critical Infrastructure 
 
 
Business Continuity for Water and Wastewater Utilities: How to Keep Your Utility in 
Business and Operating in Times of Crisis seminar, August 15 – 16, 2007, Alexandria, 
Virginia. American Water Works Association. 
 
Business Continuity for Pandemic, Natural Disaster, and Terrorism webcast (2006). 
American Water Works Association. 
 
Business Continuity Guideline: A Practical Approach for Emergency Preparedness, 
Crisis Management, and Disaster Recovery (2005). ASIS International. 
http://www.asisonline.org. 
 
Business Continuity Planning in the Event of an Influenza Pandemic: A Reference Guide   
(2007). Association of Metropolitan Water Agency. http://www.amwa.net/.  
 
Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist, version 3.5 (2005).  U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services. http://www.pandemicflu.gov/index.html. 
 
Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government and Pandemic Influenza Planning 




Continuity of Operations Planning for Pandemic Influenza Guidance (2006). U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security.  http://www.fema.gov/government/coop/index.shtm 
 
Drinking Water Supply Emergency Plan (2003).  Ohio Environmental Protection Agency.   
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/ddagw/pwswebpg.htm#vol1. 
 
Disaster Response and Recovery Planning for Water Systems: A Kit of Tools, Project 
2929 (2006).  American Water Works Association Research Foundation.   
 
Exemplary Practices in Public Health Preparedness (2005). Rand Corporation. 
www.rand.org/ 
 
Electric Sector Influenza Pandemic Planning, Preparation, and Response Reference 
Guide (2006). North American Electric Reliability Council. 
 http://esisac.com/publicdocs/Influenza%20Pandemic%20Reference%20Guide.pdf. 
 
Introduction to Continuity of Operations (COOP) on-line course (2007). U.S. 




National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (May 2006).  U.S. 
Homeland Security Council. 
 
Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Guide & Template for San Francisco City 
and County Agencies (June 2006). San Francisco Department of Public Health. 
Pandemic Influenza - A Guide for Water and Wastewater Plant Owners and Operators. 
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (2007).  
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/ddagw/pwswebpg.htm/. 
 
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide for Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (Sept. 2006). U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Pandemic Influenza Best Practices and Model Protocols (April 2007). U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security.   
 
Pandemic Preparedness Planning Checklist for Utilities and Other Businesses (2007).   
Public Service Commission of West Virginia.          
http://www.psc.state.wv.us/PanInfo/PSCChecklist200701.pdf. 
 
Project Approach for Disaster Response, Recovery and Business Continuity Planning for 



























APPENDIX G: Pandemic Influenza Plans Reviewed For This Project 
 
 
Alameda County (CA) Public Health Department – Pandemic Influenza Continuity of 
Operations Guide and Template, 2006. 
 
Alaska Division of Public Health – Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, 2007. 
 
Boston Public Health Commission – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2007. 
 
Combined Health District of Montgomery County - Public Health Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness and Response Plan for Montgomery County, Ohio, 2006. 
  
Greene County Combined Health District – Influenza Pandemic Response Plan, 2006. 
 
Indiana State Department of Health – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2006. 
 
Indian Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services – Pandemic 
Influenza Workbook, 2006. 
 
King County (WA) Health Department – Pandemic Influenza Emergency Response 
Manual, 2006. 
 
Maine- Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2005. 
 
Massachusetts – Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan, 2006. 
 
Minnesota Department of Public Health (2006). Pandemic Influenza Plan (Supplement) 
Technical Section K: Environmental Public Health, version 2.5, April 2006, p. 233. 
 
Montana Department of Health and Human Services – Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
and Response Plan. 
 
Monterey County (CA) Health Department – Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, 2005. 
 
Nashville/Davidson County Metro Public Health Department – Pandemic Influenza 
Response Plan, 2006. 
 
Ohio Department of Health – Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan 
(PIPRP), 2006. 
 
Ohio Department of Health – Pandemic Influenza Tool Kit For Ohio Schools, 2007. 
 





San Francisco City and County – Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Guide 
and Template, 2006. 
 
Santa Clara County Public Health Department - Your Guide to Preparing for Pandemic 
Flu, 2007. 
 
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. - North American Plan for Avian 
and Pandemic Influenza, 2007. 
 
South Carolina – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2006. 
 
Toronto (Canada) – Pandemic Influenza Plan, 2006. 
 
University of California, Davis Health System – Influenza Pandemic Emergency 
Response and Business Continuity Plan, 2006. 
 
U.S. Homeland Security Council – National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, 2005. 
 
U.S. Homeland Security Council -National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza 
Implementation Plan, 2006. 
 
World Health Organization – Global Influenza Preparedness Plan, 2005. 
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